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IS THE COLLECTIVE MODEL OF LABOR SUPPLY 
USEFUL FOR TAX POLICY ANALYSIS? 




The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the 
withinhousehold distributional effect of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the 
framework of a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual 
taxation system in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is 
a significant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity. 
Consequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are entirely driven by the traditional 
substitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform 
alters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A 
sensitivity analysis shows that the collective model would be required if the tax reform was 
both radical and of extended scope. 
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The design of an optimal income taxation of households is a central issue in economic policy. Apps and
Rees (1988, 1996, 1999a, 1999b) have extended earlier work from Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) in two
crucial dimensions. The ¯rst one is domestic production, the second is that household decision making can
be thought of as the outcome of a negotiation between spouses who may well have di®erent preferences.1
This extension to a multi-utility framework is based on the collective approach from Chiappori (1988,
1992) and Apps and Rees (1988) which only assume Pareto e±ciency of the household decisions.
In the 1988 paper, Apps and Rees are concerned by the implication of the tax system on distribution
within households. Their results, completed by Brett (1998)'s analysis of distributional issues of tax
reforms, have remained purely theoretical. As noted in Apps and Rees (1999b), within-household distri-
butional e®ects, even if potentially important when analyzing tax policy reforms, have been the subject
of hardly any empirical research.
The contribution of the present paper is twofold. First, we question the importance of such intra-
household redistribution resulting from a radical tax reform. We precisely tackle the case of a shift
from current joint taxation to individual anonymous taxation in France.2 Second, we simulate a col-
lective model of labor supply with taxation. The simulation methodology relies on Laisney (2002) and
the model is calibrated through heterogeneous bargaining rules and unobserved preference parameters.
Laisney (2002) use the general de¯nition of Pareto-e±ciency to circumvent the possible nonconvexity
of utility sets. Instead, we assume that couples play ex-ante \collective mixed strategies" so that only
convex hulls are considered. This allows us to rely on the maximization of a linear household welfare
function in which the weights on individual utilities give a measure of the balance of power.
Calibration is carried out on French data from the 1995 wave of the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP95, hereafter), using observed work hours of spouses. The empirical identi¯cation of the
model requires extra-assumption, namely that some aspects of individual preferences - but not all - remain
the same after marriage. There follows an estimation of the calibrated balance of power on distribution
factors, including a proxy for the wife's relative net earning power in the couple. This variable is found
to be a signi¯cant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation. However, the elasticity of the balance of
power with respect to this variable is extremely low. Subsequently, the exercise suggests that even in the
case of a radical policy reform, the distributional e®ect is of too limited scope to alter average results
regarding labor supply responses or individual welfare. One could conclude that the unitary model is a
su±cient approximation when looking at the impact of taxes on household behavior. Instead, we suggest
that further e®ort should be made to assess the distributional e®ect of various tax reforms when using
cooperative models with more structure than the collective setting.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the approach used to simulate collective
rationality. In section 3, we describe the reform. Section 4 deals with the analysis of its potential impacts
on individual labor supply and individual welfare, with and without account of distributional e®ects.
Section 5 concludes the text.
2 Simulation of a collective model of labor supply with taxation
Collective models introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992) are a substantial improvement in the modelling
of individuals living in couples. First, several studies have shown that the restrictions coming from the
collective model are seldom rejected by the data on couples, whereas those associated with the unitary
model often are.3 Second, collective spouses play a cooperative game but the bargaining solution is
unspeci¯ed so that the model encompasses both the unitary representation and other intrahousehold
negotiation models such as Horney and McElroy (1981) and Manser and Brown (1990). Third, wages,
prices, non labor income and other `distribution factors' are allowed to in°uence the balance of power
1This contrasts with the traditional \unitary" representation where household behavior is assumed to result from the
maximization of a single utility function.
2We do not consider the case of selective system with separate tax schedule for ¯rst and second earners.
3See for instance Browning and Chiappori (1998) or Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002).
1between spouses and the subsequent intrahousehold distribution of wealth and welfare.4 The richer
behavioral implications of the collective model may have serious consequences for policy analysis.
A \natural" way to assess the e®ects of a tax reform in a collective setting would be ¯rst to estimate a
model from observed labor supplies. However, in the collective framework, no simple model and no simple
econometric method are available yet accounting for the distinction between participation and hours of
work (see Blundell and al., 2001) as well as for a tax-bene¯t system leading to non-linear budget sets
(see Donni and Moreau, 2002). Consequently, we opt for a simulation approach so that our model can
incorporate (i) preferences which are not restricted to the egoistic or `caring' (µ a la Becker) cases as in most
empirical applications of collective models, (ii) non-linear budget sets, (iii) discrete labor supplies, which
account for participation and seems a lot more realistic than continuous worked hours in the case of the
French labor market. We introduce in a fully parameterized collective model some heterogeneity between
households through one preference parameter (common to husband and wife) and the intra-household
bargaining rule. The empirical identi¯cation of the model is completed through extra assumptions on
preferences.
2.1 A collective model with discrete choices and taxation
2.1.1 Collective rationality
We choose a de¯nition of the collective rationality given in Chiappori (1992), namely the maximization
by the household of a family welfare function:
Max
cf;cm;hf;hm
¹(µ)Uf(cf;hf;hm) + (1 ¡ ¹(µ))Um(cm;hm;hf) (1)
s.t. c = cf + cm · g(wfhf;wmhm;y0;³) (2)
where ci represents the private individual consumption and hi the labor supply of spouse i = f;m: Total
consumption, equivalent to total disposable income in such a static framework, depends not only on
individual earnings but also on nonlabor income y0, on household socio-demographic characteristics ³
(that can in°uence the computation of the taxes paid or the bene¯ts received) and on the tax-bene¯t
system g(). We assume that the budget constraint is binding. The weights on individual utilities are a
reduced form of the intrahousehold negotiation and depend on the set µ of all factors that can in°uence
this negotiation (distribution factors, prices and non-labor income). Hereafter, we will refer to ¹ as the
(wife's bargaining) power index.
2.1.2 Discretization and nonconvexities
We opt for a discrete choice model where the set of possible work hours re°ects the actual distribution
of hours for France. Non-participating men are withdrawn from the sample since they represent only
a very small percentage of both single and married men (see Appendices). For the same reason, the
choice of part-time work is withdrawn from the set of alternatives for men in couples. The discretization
thus consists of hf = 0;20;30;40;50 hours per week for single women and women in couples and of
hm = 20;40;45;50;60 (resp. 40;45;50;60) hours per week for single men (resp. men in couples).5
The discrete choice approach leads to nonconvex budget sets which consist of a collection of points.6
This may in turn cause subsequent nonconvex utility sets. To circumvent the problem, Laisney (2002) opt
4Distribution factors are socio-economic variablesthat are likely to in°uence the conditions in which negotiation between
spouses takesplace butdonot in°uence directly either the individual preferencesorthe budgetconstraint. See Bourguignon
and al. (1995) for a complete discussion on distribution factors. See also McElroy (1990) for the related notion of \extra-
household environmental parameters".
5Wage prediction is needed only forthe non-participating wives and isperformed usingthe panel dimension ofthe survey
to control for unobserved heterogeneity due to omitted individual-speci¯c variables. We specify an error-components model
with an individual random e®ect. Potental selection bias is not modelled explicitly but accounted for in the line of Verbeek
and Nijman (1992, 1996). Results are available upon request.
6In France, other nonconvexities can arise in the budget sets of low-wage workers as the result of the means-tested
minimum income scheme and the means-tested child and housing bene¯ts. The means-testconcerns total household income





Figure 1: possibility set with VNM utilities
for a more general collective program, namely the maximization of her utility subject to a pre-allocated
(or negotiated) level of his utility. The price to pay, however, is a very ad hoc de¯nition of the power
index.
Despite these possible nonconvexities in the utility sets, we consider only the convex hulls: we assume
that (cardinal) individual utilities are of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern type and that all couples enlarge
their domain of alternatives to include all lotteries over deterministic allocations. On Figure 1, an
equilibrium A located on the nonconcave part of the Pareto frontier is locally e±cient, as noted by
Friedman (1990). We assume that couples are globally e±cient as they play a (collective) mixed strategy
that increases their expected utilities. They negotiate ex-ante the ¯nal allocations for all the states of the
economy and all the periods over the marriage period.7 At one point in time, if the power index ¹ leads
to a slope (BC) in the utility set, the cooperative couple is indi®erent to any convex combination of B
and C. For all the other values of the power index (between 0 and 1), the frontiers of both the primitive
and the convexi¯ed sets coincide and one value leads to one allocation.
2.1.3 Speci¯cation of individual preferences
We assume that preferences of single individuals are of the Stone-Geary type, written for gender i = f;m:
Ui(ci;li) = °c
i ln(ci ¡ ci) + °l
i ln(li ¡ li) (3)
where li = T ¡ hi is the demand for non-market time for gender i = f;m, with total time endowment
T.8 We assume that preferences for individuals in couples are the same except that a speci¯c interaction
term in spouses' leisures is added, so that for each spouse i = f;m:
Ui(ci;lf;lm) = ¯
c
i ln(ci ¡ ci) + ¯
l
i ln(li ¡ li) + ± ln(lf ¡ lf) ln(lm ¡ lm): (4)
Pure leisure corresponds to li ¡ li, where the minimum level of non-market time includes time spent
for physiological regeneration and standardized aspects of household production, which vary with sex
7With our assumption, the power index does not need to be ¯xed over the periods (\full commitment" for Mazzocco,
2002). In what follows, we do not intend to model intertemporal collective behavior as in Mazzocco (2002) but rather
attempt to retrieve the outcome of the bargaining process at one point in time and one state of the economy.
8In the sequel, T = 7£24 = 168 hours a week
3and with the demographic composition of the household. The cross-leisure e®ect takes up potential
complementarity or substituability in spouses' leisure and other types of interaction between them.9 By
introducing this term, we relax the strong assumption of separability of individual preferences in the pairs
(cf;lf) and (cm;lm) that is usually made in empirical studies of collective models.10
A realistic approach requires the impact of the demographic structure of the household to be modelled
in several ways (see Browning, 1992). Here, children have no decision power in the household and their
preferences are internalized in those of the parents. They are considered as a source of additional private
consumption (for child needs) and private non-market time demand (time dedicated to childcare) for
each spouse, as suggested by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). Therefore, the minimum consumption
and `leisure' requirements ci and li of each spouse depend on the number and age of the children in
the household, according to (implicit) equivalence scales for ci and to published information on time
allocation for li.11 A full model with domestic production would require much more information than
what is typically available in household surveys and poses a host of theoretical problems.12 Still, allowing
for expenditures on children and time for childcare to be decision variables is the subject of further
research.13
2.1.4 Identi¯cation of structural parameters








mand ±) need to be identi¯ed as well as the power index ¹.
First, we assume comparability of utility between spouses and choose to normalize both the wife's and





i + ± = 1 i = f;m: (5)
Second, we make the crucial identifying assumption that individuals in couples keep the same relative












= ®i i = f;m (6)
where the ° coe±cients can be estimated on two samples of single men and women separately, as we see






1+®i: Third, heterogeneity across households
is captured through the coe±cient ± and the structural term ¹. For each household in the sample of
couples, these two degrees of freedom are calibrated on the two observed labor supplies.
9Theoretical distinction between individual and shared leisure in a collective framework is modelled by Fong and Zhang
(2001).
10Browning and Chiappori (1998) is an exception, but their paper is not primarily concerned with labor supply. In our
setting, there isnoexternality with respect to consumption so thatthe preferences are a little less general than the altruistic
speci¯cation. See also Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002).
11The individual minimum consumption ci(z) is set equal to c(z)=2¡ 1. The household minimum consumption c(z)
is computed as the lowest disposable income for all possible combinations of male and female labor supplies within each
demographic group. Consequently, this level depends on the number of children via the implicit equivalence scale of the
tax-bene¯tsystemin the lowerpartofthe income distribution. In couples withoutchildren, the individual minimum leisure
li is set arbitrarily to 92 (resp. 95) hours a week for men (resp. women). For households with children, we need to account
for some minimum time requirement for household production associated with childcare: this minimum level is computed
according to the French Time Allocation Survey 1998 (INSEE). Additional weekly time is set according to the age of the
youngest child: for the wife (resp.) the husband: 14 (7) hours if at least one child up to age 5, 6 (3) hours if at least one
child is between 6 and 11, 5 (2) hours if at least one child is older than 11.
12Theoretical support for domestic production can be found in Chiappori (1997) and Apps and Rees (1997) when the
domestic good is consumed privately. See Lewbel and al. (2001) and Chiappori and al. (2002) for household public
consumption.
13Chiuri (1999) provides the ¯rst attempt to test a collective model with domestic production of childcare.
14By doing so, we follow the suggestion made by McElroy (1990) concerning the use of data on singles to partly recover
information about the preferences of individuals in couples. The same assumption was used by Barmby and Smith (2001)
in a simpler setting with two-earner households and linearised budget restrictions. In a paper by Lewbel, Browning and
Chiappori (2001), the assumption made is that singles and individuals in couples have the same preferences over a bundle
of private good equivalents.
4Using (5) and (6), it is easily shown that concavity restrictions on individual utility functions imply
that ± 2]±min;±max[ with:
±min = ¡
1
(1 + ®i) ln(lj ¡ lj) ¡ 1
for i;j = f;m
±max = 1:
2.2 Estimation of relative preferences toward own leisure and consumption
on single individuals
Estimations of preference parameters are carried out (separately for single men and women) on restricted
subsamples without children. This is mainly justi¯ed by the fact that single individuals who are also single
parents may have unobserved characteristics that change the resulting estimates substantially. Still, the
single individuals we consider may well have some children living outside the household.
We assume that the utility derived by individual k for each choice j and each subsequent consumption
is a random function,
U(ckj;hj) = °
c ln(ckj ¡ ck) + °
l ln(T ¡ hj ¡ lk) + "kj (7)
where "kj is a random term with mean zero. Furthermore, let us assume that this utility level is in-
dependent of the utility levels at other options, conditional on observables. This makes it possible to
estimate the ° parameters using McFadden's conditional logit model. To incorporate some observed het-
erogeneity, we let the ° coe±cients vary linearly with individual characteristics like age and education.
We also account for unobserved heterogeneity by introducing mass points in the parameters which allow
each individual to choose between di®erent preference regimes. This methodology, suggested by Hoynes
(1996), proved more e±cient, both in terms of likelihood and predictive power, than the use of continu-
ous random errors as in Random Parameter Logit models µ a la Van Soest (1995) or McFadden and Train
(2000).
Conditioning on observables, individuals are drawn from a mixture of R regimes, regime r correspond-
ing to a given pair of mass points (µcr;µlr) for the coe±cients for consumption and leisure. Each pair is
observed with probability ¼r = Pr(µc = µcr;µl = µlr), with
P
r ¼r = 1. Both the mass points and their
associated probabilities are estimated as parameters of the model. The unconditional choice probability









Results of the estimation are given in the Appendices. Eventually, we use the resulting estimates on
singles and the relation (6) to compute individual relative preferences ® toward consumption and leisure
for all husbands and wives of the sample of couples.
2.3 Calibration of cross-leisure preferences and bargaining rules
We calibrate the model using the program (1) and a computer microsimulation of the budget constraint
(2). For each discrete combination of labor supplies (hf;hm), the microsimulation software computes the
function g() and provides the corresponding disposable income for the household. The computation is
faithful to the 1995 French tax-bene¯t system and is carried out by means of the actual wages for workers
and predicted wages for non-working women. To simplify the algorithm, we use our speci¯cation (7), so
the ¯rst-order conditions of the program (1) with respect to cf and cm are:




















5with c = cf + cm: If we denote p by
cf¡cf
c¡c the wife's share of \negotiable" consumption, it is entirely











The ¯rst-order conditions combined with the budget constraint yield to:
cf = cf + p(¹)[g(wfhf;wmhm;y0;³) ¡ c] (10)
cm = cm + [1 ¡ p(¹)][g(wfhf;wmhm;y0;³) ¡ c] (11)
and the collective program conditioned on the value of the unknown parameters (¹ and ±) simpli¯es to:
Max
hf;hm
¹Uf(hf;hm=±;¹) + (1 ¡ ¹)Um(hm;hf=±;¹) (12)
We vary ± over 30 steps in the bracket ]±min;±max[ and ¹ over 30 steps in [0;1] to obtain 900 combinations
(¹;±); for each pair, the optimal allocation fhf(¹;±);hm(¹;±)g is given by the maximization of the
household welfare function (12).15 Assuming that couples behave according to collective rationality, the








h the observed labor supplies.16
General results from the calibration are presented in Table 1. These include the distribution over the
couples of the calibrated cross-leisure parameter ±
¤ and of the other preference parameters (the asterisks
are omitted hereafter to simplify notation). The average and median shares of consumption for the wives
is around 60% whereas the wives' bargaining power is close to 51% on average. The distribution of the
power index over the sample is illustrated by Figure 2.
Table 1: preference parameters, power index and consumption share
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. 10% Median 90% Max.
¯
l
f .432 .049 .280 .365 .435 .497 .553
¯
c
f .554 .060 .319 .480 .552 .635 .706
± .014 .058 -.137 -.040 .003 .085 .345
¯
l
m .601 .043 .378 .537 .615 .638 .705
¯
c
m .385 .036 .251 .348 .381 .438 .535
¹ .511 .078 .167 .467 .5 .6 .867
p .598 .078 .105 .535 .591 .682 .895
The cross-leisure e®ect ± is positive on average and increases with the number of children after the ¯rst
one (cf. Table 2), accounting for possible complementarity between spouses' leisure activities. However,
around 47% of the couples have a negative cross-leisure e®ect. The fact that leisures are substitutes in
direct utility for so many households is surprising and may result from the way we import parameters
15For a given ±, the programconsiders only the allocations on the convex hull of the frontier when varying ¹ in the range
[0;1] so that the households are globally e±cients as assumed above.






























Figure 2: distribution of the power index
estimated for singles into the preferences of individuals in couples.17 It makes sense that most of the
households with a negative ± are two-earner couples. Their average weekly hours of work are 38.0 for
women and 43.9 for men compared to respectively 15.6 and 41.4 in households with a positive ±. Since
Table 2: preference parameters in function of the family size
Variable / nb of children 0 1 2 3
¯
l
f .433 .429 .431 .439
¯
c
f .550 .561 .554 .544
± .016 .010 .015 .017
¯
l
m .602 .603 .599 .598
¯
c
m .382 .386 .385 .384
the grid used here is quite ¯ne, there is not much di®erence between calibrated and observed hours: this
is the case for 94.7% of the husbands and 99.0% of the wives. This set of calibrated hours is used as the
pre-reform situation or `collective baseline situation'.
2.4 Estimation of the power index
The weight ¹ provides a local index for the balance of power within each household, and we attempt to
use exogenous factors to model it. According to Browning and Chiappori (1998), these are the prices
(individual wages), non-labor income and the distribution factors, all gathered in the vector µ.
2.4.1 Distribution factors
The income pooling assumption is one of the major criticisms of the unitary model. In our collective
setting, it seems desirable to include a variable related to the relative earnings of the spouses or rather
to their relative earning potential. With nonlinear taxation, net-of-tax wages are endogenous to labor
supply decisions and cannot be used directly. Instead, we suggest a measure of the way the tax system
modi¯es the relative earning power of the wife (REP). If we note Rhf;hm the net earned income received
by the household when she works hf weekly hours and he works hm hours, then we de¯ne her relative
17It may also comes from the factthat not all domestic production is accounted forin required levels of non-market time
l. Further research is needed there.





This is a simple index to account for some distortion of the tax system on the wife's relative contribution
to net income, but it turns out to play a key role in what follows. If a reform alters REP dramatically,
it may change the intrahousehold distribution of resources.
There are few example of policy reform that changes who controls the resources within the household.
The point is tackled theoretically by Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1996), among others, with the famous
\wallet to purse" reform, namely the shift from husband to wife as child allowance recipient. Empirical
studies on this question can be found, for instance, in Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1996). To our knowl-
edge, however, nothing has been said empirically about intrahousehold distribution when considering a
radical change in the taxation of couples. Considering that the present attempt is a pure simulation
exercise, it would seem desirable to introduce more structure in the model. This can be done by opting
for a Nash-bargaining model with internal threat points, in the fashion of Lundberg and Pollak (1993,
1996), or external threat points as in Manser and Brown (1980) or McElroy and Horney (1981). This is
beyond the scope of the present study, as we are mainly interested in the implementation of the more
general collective representation when accounting for taxation.18
On top of the REP variable, we simply use the relevant distribution factors that can be built from
the data : the di®erence in age between the spouses; the di®erence in education level (the exogeneity of
human capital accumulation is assumed); the di®erence in unemployment rate. Descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 3.
Table 3: statistics of the distribution factors, wages and non-labor income
Variable Mean. Median. Std. Dev.
REP .749 0.67 .39
wf 7.56 6.53 4.05
wm 10.27 8.72 6.01
y0 873 277 1762
dage -1.90 -2 3.68
dedu -.26 0 3.09
durate -4.31 -4.8 4.44
Notes: REP : her relative earning power as explained in the text; wf: her wage rate (euros); wm: his wage rate (euros);
y0: level of yearly total capital income (euros); dage: hers minus his age; dedu : hers minus his education level; durate:
relevant male minus female unemployment rates (depend on age and education level).
2.4.2 Results of the estimation
We turn to the estimation of the power index on vector µ: First, we assume the same fonctional repre-




) = µ´ + u
to ensure that the predicted index lies in [0,1]. The regression is simply conducted by OLS method. The
error term u capture all unobserved and unexplained heterogeneity among households. The results of the
estimation are presented in Table 4.
18We do not address the question fromBrowning and Lechene (2001) about the collective model: the theory around this
general representation of household behavior does not give any guidance as to what variables should appear in the set of
distribution factors.
8Table 4: estimation of the power index
Coef. name Variable coef. robust s.e.
´ 0 constant -0.083 (.056)
´ 1 REP .391** (.081)
´ 2 (REP )
2 -0.091** (.018)
´ 3 wf -.001 (.004)
´ 4 wm -.009** (.003)
´ 5 y0=100 .002** (.000)
´ 6 dage -.003 (.002)
´ 7 dedu -.007* (.003)
´ 8 durate .006** (.002)
Adj. R-squared 0.11
Notes: signi¯cance levels of 5 and 1% are noted * and ** respectively. The covariance matrix isrobust to heteroscedasticity
of unknown form.
An important ¯nding is that the variable REP is a signi¯cant determinant of the power index, with the
expected sign. On the whole, the higher the wife's earning potential, the higher her bargaining position.
However, the marginal e®ect of REP decreases with its level. This concave shape was suggested by a
nonparametric regression of ln(
¹
1¡¹) on REP and appeared to be robust to all speci¯cations tested.
As can be shown from Table 5, the elasticity of the power index to the REP variable is very low.19
At the median value of her Relative Earning Power, a 10% rise in REP translates into a 0:89% increase
of the power index.
Table 5: elasticity of the power index to the REP variable
Percentile 1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99
Elasticity .033 .051 .059 .075 .089 .098 .096 .084 .024
Note: The elasticity is evaluated at di®erent percentiles of the REP variable, other covariates kept constant at the sample
median.
The husband's wage in°uences negatively his wife's bargaining power whereas her own wage has no
impact.20 Also, the higher her chances to ¯nd a job on the market relative to her husband's (i.e. the higher
durate), the higher her power index. The negative sign of the di®erential of education is unexpected.
Finally, age does not signi¯cantly a®ect the distribution of the power index.
Interpreting the power index requires a great deal caution. First, most of the non-strictly environ-
mental parameters probably involve identi¯cation issues. Second, one could claim that many relevant
distribution factors are missing in the regression. Our interest, though, is not to predict the balance of
power but to simulate the likely change in the distribution due to a variation of her REP after a change
in tax policy. In the remainder of the paper, we use the predicted values of the power index with retention
of residuals e u from the estimation (household-speci¯c unobserved heterogeneity).
3 Description of the tax reform
The current income tax regime in France is an extension of the splitting system to account for the
presence of dependent children. Both spouses face the same marginal tax rate. We suggest a shift from
this joint system to individual taxation. This is likely to increase the marginal tax rate faced by the ¯rst
19A sensitivity analysis presented in what follows concludes that this result is not due to the use of singles' preferences
as an identifying assumption (cf. Table 10).
20This resultcould be anticipated after running anonparametric regression of ln(
¹
1¡¹)on REP. No relationship between
these two variables appears.
9(higher-wage) earner and decrease the rate faced by the second (lower-wage) earner, the wife in 73% of
the couples.
3.1 Current income taxation in France
In France, income taxation rules for year t apply to income of year t ¡ 1 so that we use the rules of
1996 to compute taxes for the 1995 sample of couples. Taxable labor income consists of earned income
net of social contributions and special contributions (deductible \CSG"). Deductions for work expenses
(10%) are also withdrawn as well as a special deduction (20%) for salary earners.21 The progressive tax
schedule, denoted by t(), is a piecewise linear function with 7 marginal tax rates (from 0 to 54%).
We describe the rules regarding married couples in what follows. Let the household total taxable
income be y = yf + ym with yi the taxable income of spouse i = f;m. To account for the family
dimension, the tax schedule is applied to the equivalized taxable income y=s where the number of adult-
equivalents s = 2 + k is computed using the o±cial equivalence scale for children k: 0:5 for each of the
two ¯rst children and 1 for each additional child. Eventually, tax liability is computed as:
T = st(y=s): (13)
This leads to lower marginal tax rates for married couples than for single individuals and lower still for
families with children. Given the progressivity of the income tax schedule, this method of calculation
implies that the deduction for children is larger in rich than in poor families and aceilingon that deduction
prevents a too large inequity.
3.2 From joint to individual taxation
We consider a switch from joint to individual taxation: each spouse in the household will pay an income
tax based on his or her sole earned income.22 As for the treatment of the family size, we choose a natural
adaptation of the existing system and assume that k is equally shared between spouses. The number of
adult-equivalents in the individual tax unit of spouse i = f;m is then written:
si = 1+ k=2
so that individual tax becomes:
Ti = sit(yi=si)
and household income tax is T = Tf + Tm. With this reform, the rules for married couples come close to
the ones for cohabiting spouses. With the individualized system, though, spouses do not have the ability
to allocate k freely among them.
3.3 Direct impact on tax liabilities and welfare
The proposed reform alters the budget constraint and leads to a new Pareto frontier. At this stage,
however, we do not account for behavioral responses to the reform. The allocation (hf;hm;p) does not
change and the new location (Uf;Um) may not be on the new frontier.
Table 6 describe the variations of the tax burden after the reform: the e®ect on married spouses can
either be negative or neutral. When their contributions to the household resources are close, both spouses
are individually taxed in the same bracket as was the equivalized joint income of the couple. Therefore,
they both face the same marginal tax rate as before and total tax liability of the household does not vary.
This happens for 35:5% of the couples (including households paying no tax).
21This is aimed at making the tax treatment of salary earnings and self-employment earnings homogeneous since the
latter are generally under-reported.
22The main part of the capital income is taxed via a di®erent system so that interferences with such type of reform are
limited.
10Table 6: variation in tax liability after the reform (no behavioral responses)
no change change in tax liability
tax pre-reform tax post-reform tax relative increase
% of households 35.5 64.5 64.5 63.3*
Mean 2228 3322 4243 67%
Median 1767 1849 2530 19%
Std. Dev. 2346 4777 5512 1.02
10% 0 397 932 2%
90% 4822 7269 8528 188%
* Around 1.2% of the couples did not pay tax before the reform and pay a yearly average of 641 euros after the reform.
Annual tax liabilities are given in euro.
For all other couples, a substantial gap exists between spouses' incomes, either due to a wage gap,
a di®erence in labor supplies or both. With the reform, the e®ective marginal tax rate faced by the
second earner falls or remains the same whereas the one faced by the ¯rst earner rises in most cases.
The latter e®ect tends to dominate, so that the tax burden increases. One-earner couples experience the
worst losses, as the number of adult-equivalents is reduced by 1 + k=2 after the reform. On average, the
tax liability increases by 920 euros yearly and by 67% in relative terms. Many couples experience an
important rise whereas their original tax burden is very low: the increase for the median couple is \only"
19%.
These ¯gures are close to the o±cial ¯gures proposed by the French Ministry of Finance (see Briaire
and Echevin, 2002). National tax revenue from married couples increases by 21:2% with the shift from
joint to individual taxation. The fact that the reform is not revenue neutral is not a matter of concern
for the present exercise. First, we do not intend to compare several reforms, which would need to be done
on the same cost basis. Second, neutrality would require changing the tax schedule. Researchers from
the Ministry of Finance suggest that a decrease of 13% of all tax rates (in all brackets and all types of
households) would achieve neutrality but would result in a huge redistribution from married couples to
cohabiting couples and singles. Having in mind a bargaining model µ a la Manser and Brown (1980), this
could dramatically change the ¯nancial situation of spouses of getting divorced (their threat point), and
therefore the balance of power of married couples. Our model is not well suited to pursue this point.
Table 7 presents the impact of the reform on consumption and welfare. As the tax liability increases,
total disposable income and individual consumptions decrease by 1:9% on average. Both individual
utilities decrease as well, but slightly more for wives (¡0:27%) than for husbands (¡0:23%), as their
propensity to consume is more important (55:4% on average, opposed to 38:5% on average for husbands).
Total household welfare W = ¹Uf + (1¡ ¹)Um drops by 0:26%.
Table 7: impact of the reform on distribution of wealth and welfare (no behavioral response)
Pre-reform Post-reform variation
c 636 624 -1.9%
cf 360 353 -1.9%
cm 276 271 -1.9%
Uf 100 99.73 -0.27%
Um 100 99.77 -0.23%
W 100 99.74 -0.26%
Note: ¯gures correspond to mean values over the sample of couples; consumptions are given in euros/week; post-reform
utilities are expressed relatively to pre-reform utilities normalized to 100; the same for total welfare.
114 Simulation of household responses
This section deals with the main objective of the study, namely the simulation of collective labor supply
responses to tax reforms. We break down the responses in two stages. In the ¯rst step, we assume that
weights on individual utilities are constant, which makes our setting a true unitary model. In a second
step, we allow an additional change in the power index resulting from a change in the REP after the
reform: this distributional e®ect is speci¯c to the collective setting. In both cases, we analyze the labor
supply responses and the subsequent changes in individual welfare.
4.1 Unitary response to the reform
At this stage, we treat the model as a unitary one, assuming that ¹ does not depend on prices or
distribution factors and consequently on REP and the tax system. The decision process consists of
the maximization of a ¯xed household welfare function as in Samuelson (1956).23 As budget constraints
become less favorable on average, utility sets are likely to shrink toward the origin and unitary households
optimize so that the new location (Uf;Um) be on the new frontier.
Such behavioral responses are due to the impact of the reform on the budget constraints. Individual
labor supply reactions are only driven by traditional substitution and income e®ects. E®ective marginal
tax rate of ¯rst earners (resp. second earners) rise (resp. fall) on average so that substitution e®ects
imply a likely decrease of husbands' labor supply and increase of wives' hours and participation. Indeed,
7:64% of the husbands decrease their working time whereas only 0:63% of them increase it. Among wives,
15:07% of them re-enter the labor market and 6:74% increase their working time. The income e®ect (a
decrease in total disposable income) o®sets only partially the negative substitution e®ect on male labor
and strengthens the positive e®ect on female labor supply. On the whole, 21:8% of the women react to
the reform when only 8:27% of the men. As noted in Table 8, some households experience a joint reaction
of both spouses (with opposite signs).
Table 8: labor supply response after the unitary e®ect: variation in hours/week
wivesnhusbands -10 -5 0 +5 Total
0 0 1.67 75.9 0.63 78.19
10 .28 1.46 5 0 6.74
20 .35 3.75 10.83 0 14.93
30 .14 0 0 0 .14
Total .76 6.88 91.73 .63 1440
Note: entries in the table give frequencies (in%), except the last cell which gives the number of observations.
As a result, total disposable income increases by 2:9% on average. Weights on individual utilities
are ¯xed so that the consumption share does not change and both individual consumptions increase
proportionally. Details are presented in Table 9.
Overall, husbands gain leisure and consumption whereas women's loss of leisure is not o®set by the
smallconsumption gain. Therefore, the reallocation of labor force within households leads to an increase in
husbands' welfare but a drop in wives' utilities. Total household welfare increases by 0:05%. A traditional
unitary model would simply conclude that labor supply responses are slightly welfare-improving, ignoring
completely the con°icting situations that may take place within households (welfare gains for husbands
and welfare losses for wives). Our multi-utility framework shows that the classical substitution and
income e®ects following a reform can be responsible for such intrahousehold redistributions of welfare,
as they change the allocation of leisures. It should be noted, however, that domestic production is not
formally modelled here.24
23Formally, Chiappori (1992) and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1992) note that such household welfare index cannot be
distinguished from a unitary function since weights and preference parameters cannot be disentangled.
24The subsequent question regarding female welfare is whether women re-entering the labor market experience an equiv-
alent drop in their housework. Time use surveys suggest that this is unlikely. In countries where female participation is
12Table 9: post-reform distribution of wealth and welfare (with and without unitary response)
no response unitary response variation
c 624 642 +2.9%
cf 353 363 +2.9%
cm 271 279 +2.9%
Uf 99.73 99.55 -0.2%
Um 99.77 100.20 +0.4%
W 99.74 99.79 +0.05%
Note: ¯gures correspond to mean values over the sample of couples; consumptions are given in euros/week; post-reform
utilities (with or without unitary responses) are expressed relatively to pre-reform utilities normalized to 100; the same for
total welfare.
4.2 Collective response to the reform
We now account for the distributional e®ect of the reform via the REP variable. It is well known that
joint taxation imposes a tax burden on the second earner through marginal tax rates that are higher than
those she would normally face. As seen above, an individualization of the tax system has consequently
a strong incentive e®ect as the net wages of second earners dramatically increase. Moreover, the net
potential contribution of a second earner (resp. ¯rst earner) may increase (resp. decrease), i.e., the
female Relative Earning Power (REP) may rise substantially. Note that we consider female potential
earnings. Hence, even if only 64:5% of the couples experience an actual change in their tax liability, all
the couples of the sample face a new value of the REP variable. With the reform, REP increases by





















Denote a the ¯rst expression in brackets and b the second. The denominator is positive as well as a and
b. The sign of ¢REP is given by aR0;40 ¡ bR¤
0;40. For all households, R0;40 > R¤
0;40 as the number of
adult-equivalent is automatically reduced by 1 + k=2 in one-earner couples. If a ¸ b, her contribution
by taking a full-time job is larger after the reform and ¢REP ¸ 0: This is the case for 98:6% of the
couples.25 For a quarter of them, the wife is ¯rst earner (wf > wm). We can write:













Both expressions in brackets are negative or null (the reform increases the tax liability) but the absolute
value of the second is larger since the lost for one-earner couples is more important. For the other three-






substantial and ¢REP larger. Indeed, REP increases by 9% when the wife is ¯rst earner (26% of the
couples) and by 17:1% when the husband is ¯rst earner.
If vector µ
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:
comparable to male, wives still perform much more burdensome domestic activities than husbands (for instance, see Bonke
and al. (2002) for Denmark).
25Among the remaining 1:4% of the couples, only 0:3% have a << b so that ¢REP < 0:
13This corresponds to a change in favor of the wives in the intrahousehold negotiation. However, the
elasticity of the power index to the REP variable is extremely small (see Table 5) sothat the distributional
e®ect that takes place is very slim. A possible explanation to this ¯nding could be related to our
empirical identi¯cation assumption, i.e the use of singles' preference parameters. We then compute
several simulation exercises in the neighborhood of the estimates obtained from singles. Table 10 reports
some of the results in terms of elasticities. It appears that the e®ect of REP on ¹ are even smaller in
magnitude.
Table 10: Sensitivity of the elasticity of the power index to the REP variable
Percentile 1 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 99
b °
c
f + a;b °
l
f ¡ a, b °
c
m + a;b °
l
m ¡ a 0.013 0.022 0.025 0.033 0.041 0.049 0.055 0.057 0.053
b °
c
f + a;b °
l
f ¡ a; b °
c
m ¡ a;b °
l
m + a 0.014 0.021 0.025 0.031 0.036 0.038 0.034 0.027 -0.010
b °
c
f ¡ a;b °
l
f + a; b °
c
m + a;b °
l
m ¡ a 0.017 0.028 0.033 0.045 0.057 0.072 0.086 0.095 0.109
b °
c
f ¡ a;b °
l
f + a; b °
c
m ¡ a;b °
l
m + a 0.013 0.020 0.024 0.032 0.040 0.049 0.056 0.059 0.059
b °
c
f + b;b °
l
f ¡ b; b °
c
m + b;b °
l
m ¡ b 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.018 0.023 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.022
b °
c
f + b;b °
l
f ¡ b; b °
c
m ¡ b;b °
l
m + b 0.013 0.021 0.023 0.029 0.032 0.031 0.022 0.009 -0.045
b °
c
f ¡ b;b °
l
f + b; b °
c
m + b;b °
l
m ¡ b 0.014 0.024 0.029 0.041 0.054 0.072 0.092 0.108 0.143
b °
c
f ¡ b;b °
l
f + b; b °
c
m ¡ b;b °
l
m + b 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.011
Notes: Elasticities are evaluated at di®erent percentiles of the REP variable, other covariates kept constant at the sample
median. The parameters b °
j
i; for i = f;m and j = c;l; are singles' estimates of preference parameters. The scalars a and
b are respectively equal to 0.05 and 0.1.
The female power index increases on average by 1:1%. Table 11 compares the variation in both the
REP variable and the power index after the reform.
Table 11: joint variation in REP and the power index
REP ¹
Pre-reform Post-reform variation Pre-reform Post-reform variation
Mean .749 .839 14.97% .511 .516 1.09%
Std. Dev. .39 .39 .09 .078 .077 .005
Min. .09 .16 -2.3% .167 .169 -.30%
10% .35 .43 6.4% .467 .471 .48%
Median .67 .76 12.8% .5 .505 1.02%
90% 1.20 1.30 26.2% .6 .605 1.75%
Max. 4.58 4.59 84.5% .867 .870 3.10%
By construction, a shift in the balance of power in favor of the wives should increase their consumption
share and their leisure and decrease male leisure. However, the distributional e®ect is too small to imply
dramatic changes. Overall, only 0:6% of the women decrease their labor supply and only by 10 hours.
As for men, 2:4% of them increase their labor supply (0:4% by 5 hours and 2% by 10 hours). Table 12
shows that compared to the strong responses driven by the traditional e®ects in a unitary setting, the
distributional e®ect has a marginal impact on labor supplies. At this stage, one may conclude that as far
as work incentives are concerned, the unitary model o®ers a reasonable approximation of behaviors for
policy analysis.
Table 12: average labor supply
Pre-reform Post- reform and unitary e®ect Post-reform and collective e®ect
hf (h/week) 26.2 29.9 29.8
hm (h/week) 42.2 41.8 42.0
14Overall labor supply increases very slightly; so does total disposable income (+0:08%). However,
the rise of the female bargaining power leads to a larger female consumption share p on average (from
59:8% to 60:3% of total negotiable consumption). Consequently, women consumption increases by 0:76%
whereas men consumption falls by 0:79% on average. The distributional e®ect is welfare-improving for
the wives but decreases husbands' utility as noted in Table 13. This is true on average and for all the
couples experiencing a rise in REP (99:7% of the sample).26 Table 14 summarizes the three steps and
Table 13: post-reform distribution of wealth and welfare (with unitary vs collective responses)
unitary response collective response variation
c 642 643 +0.08%
cf 363 367 +0.76%
cm 279 276 -0.79%
Uf 99.55 99.68 +0.13%
Um 100.20 100.03 -0.17%
W 99.79 99.89 +0.09%
Note: ¯gures correspond to mean values over the sample of couples; consumptions are given in euro/week; post-reform
utilities (with unitary or collective responses) are expressed relatively to pre-reform utilities normalized to 100; the same
for total welfare.
shows that the distributional e®ect tends to o®set partly the welfare incidence of the unitary response.27
Table 14: impact of the reform on individual and total welfare
welfare no reponse unitary response collective response
Uf 99.73 99.55 99.68
Um 99.77 100.20 100.03
W 99.75 99.80 99.89
Note: post-reform utilities (with unitary, collective or no responses) are expressed relatively to pre-reform utilitiesnormal-
ized to 100; the same for total welfare.
However, this counter-e®ect is of limited scope. With the unitary e®ect, 7:5% of the wives experience a
welfare fall of more than 1% in magnitude (minimum: ¡5:3%) whereas 16:25% of the husbands experience
a welfare rise of at least 1% (maximum: +12:6%). With the distributional e®ect, only 1:9% of the wives
gain more than 1% of welfare (maximum: +5:7%) and 2:5% of the husbands lose more than 1% (minimum:
¡11:3%).
When we distinguish between the unitary and distributional e®ects, it appears that welfare changes
are of comparable magnitude in both cases but of limited scope in the latter. This is mainly due to the
reform at stake, which targets only part of the population as poor households do not pay income tax.
Therefore, we conduct a sensitivity analysis in two steps.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
First, we question how sensitive the results are to the variation of the power index, both in scope and in
magnitude. Second, we wonder how radical (in scope and magnitude) a reform should be to require the
use of a model that accounts for distributional e®ects (a collective model).
Considering the fact that the income tax reform increased the power index on average by 1:1% and
at most by 3:1%, we conduct our sensitivity analysis by increasing the power index of all couples by 1%,
26As ¹ is larger than 0:5 on average, the variations in individual utilities result in a rise of household welfare (+0:09%).
27Further evidence of the underlying e®ects on the reform, notably when lookingtodi®erentfamily situations, is available
on request.
152:5% and 5%. The 5% increase is interpreted as an upper bound (in magnitude) of what a tax policy
reform could realistically accomplish.
The impact of each respective rise of the power index on average individual labor supplies is presented
in Tables 15 and 16. For a redistribution of power of limited magnitude but large scope (¹ + 1% for all
couples), the e®ect is small. If we consider a larger magnitude, that is ¹ + 2:5% (close to the maximum
e®ect of a radical reform as the one simulated previously), then 3:6% of the wives diminish their working
time (0:5% stop working) whereas more than 10% of husbands increase it. These adjustments are not
marginal and a distributional e®ect of that kind cannot be ignored. It may be too large, however, to be
accomplished by a tax reform.
Table 15: distributional e®ect on average labor supplies
¹ Post- unitary e®ect Post- distributional e®ect
¹ + 1% ¹ + 2:5% ¹ + 5%
hf (h/week) 29.9 29.8 29.5 29.1
hm (h/week) 41.8 41.95 42.1 42.4
Table 16: labor supply response of uniform rises of the power index
¹ + 1% ¹ + 2:5% ¹+ 5%
wivesnhusbands 0 5 10 Total 0 5 10 Total 0 5 10 Total
-20 0 .1 0 .1 .2 .3 0 .5 .6 .5 .1 1.1
-10 .3 .1 .2 .6 2.1 .7 .3 3.1 3 2.4 .6 6
0 97.7 1.3 .2 99.2 92.8 3.3 .3 96.4 85.8 6.4 .7 92.9
Total 98 1.5 .4 1440 95.1 4.3 .6 1440 89.3 9.3 1.4 1440
Note: entries in the table give frequencies(in%), except the lastcell (bottom right) ofeach column, which givesthe number
of observations.
The impact on individual utilities is presented in Table 17. On Figure 3, the vertical axis displays
the change (in %) in male utility and the horizontal axis the change in female utility. It appears that
there is no dramatic change in individual welfare on average. If we apply a large e®ect (+2:5%) on every
couples, 95% of them experience a rise in female utility of less than 1% and 92% a fall of male welfare
smaller than 1%.
Table 17: impact of uniform rises of the power index ¹
¹ Uf Um
Mean 10% Median 90% Mean 10% Median 90%
1% +.12% +.06% +.08% +.09% -.17% -.16% -.09% -.07%
2.5% +.30% +.16% +.20% +.23% -.41% -.60% -.23% -.17%
5% +.60% +.32% +.39% +1.37% -.84% -1.85% -.47% -.35%
We now focus on the 2:5% and 5% increases.28 We study the distribution of increases in REP (in
percentage) over the sample so that all the couples uniformly face a 2:5% or a 5% rise of their female
power index. This is compared with the distribution in the case of the income tax reform simulated
previously. Results are illustrated by Figure 4. To obtain a uniform rise of 5% of the female power index,
REP must increase by 76% on average (and between +63% and +104% for 80% of the couples). Even
in the case of a 2:5% rise, a large increase in REP is required: +35% on average and between +27%
and +48% for 80% of the couples.29 It is unlikely that a credible tax reform can produce such dramatic
28The 1% increase is what we obtained on average with the income tax reform.
29Note that the concave relationship between ¹ and REP prevents respectively 5:5% and 14:6% of the couples to full¯ll
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Figure 3: Changes in individual utilities (in %) resulting from a uniform rise of the power index
variations in her Relative Earning Power. In the case of the simulated reform, REP rises only by 15%
on average (and between +6% and +26% for 80% of the couples).
Our results do not contradict - but complement - the income pooling test literature as in Lundberg,
Pollak and Wales (1996). These authors use as a \natural experiment" the policy change in the UK that
transferred a substantial child allowance from husbands to wives in the late 1970s. They ¯nd that it
results in a strong distribution e®ect which increases expenditures on women's clothing and children's
goods. However, their paper deals with consumption patterns whereas our model is calibrated on labor
supplies. In our case, all the heterogeneity in the power index is assumed to be captured through the
variance in individual labor supplies.
5 Conclusion
Using real data on French married couples, we have calibrated a two-utility model of labor supply where
couples make Pareto-e±cient decisions. Weights on individual utilities proves signi¯cantly dependent on
a proxy for the wives' net relative earning power but with a very low elasticity. We simulate the shift from
joint to individual taxation in France and introduce behavioral responses. First, the calibrated weights
are assumed to be ¯xed so that the model is of the unitary type. Traditional substitution and income
e®ects create strong incentives for second earners (mostly wives) to reenter the labor market. Second,
the wives' relative earning power increases dramatically with the reform and we allow the power index to
vary with it. The resulting distributional e®ect, which makes the model speci¯cally collective, is too small
to change policy analysis on labor supply responses. On the normative side, the multi-utility framework
reveals con°icting situations between spouses: husbands seem to gain at the expense of wives after the
reallocation of labor supply due to the substitution and income e®ects. Interestingly, the distributional
e®ect tends to o®set this result.
The scope of the welfare changes is too limited to draw clear results on average so that we conduct a
sensitivity analysis. It appears that a signi¯cative change in labor supplies and individual welfare requires
a dramatic change in the wife's Relative Earning Power, both in scope and magnitude, which is unlikely
to be accomplished by a tax reform.
It may seem from this simulation exercise that the collective model is super°uous for tax policy
analysis, as the distributional e®ect we capture are marginal compared to traditional e®ects. Does it
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Figure 4: Distribution of the increase in REP (in %) over the population
for analyzing tax reforms? We rather suggest that the implementation of a more structural model is
desirable and that some improvements are necessary.
First, the proper choice of threat points would improve the characterization of distributional e®ects
implied by certain tax policies. In our model, the wife's Relative Earning Power tells us which spouse
contributes the most to household net income and as such, can be thought of as a determinant of
underlying internal threat points.
Second, it may be the case that the nature of the reform is important. A targeted reform with a
\gender tag" - as in Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1996) - may have a stronger in°uence on household
behavior than a reform of income taxation. It should be recognized in future empirical studies that the
various components of a tax-bene¯t system may have a di®erent incidence on within-household actual
transfers. Money management practices can be such that the sharing rule concerning earned income
is more egalitarian than the sharing of speci¯c allowances, especially allowances which are targeted to
one household member. These arguments are purely hypothetical but deserve to be investigated jointly
and separately.30 They open a large research avenue, both theoretically and empirically, on the close
relationship between complex sharing arrangements, the speci¯c roles and incidence of the various tax-
bene¯t components and outcomes such as expenditure patterns or labor supplies.
Third, our results depend partly on speci¯c assumptions concerning discretization, functional forms
and comparability of utilities. A welfare analysis along the lines of Small and Rosen (1981) or Bhattarai
and Whalley (1997) could be useful. Further improvements are also needed. The minimum required
consumption goes some way in the direction of subsuming public goods (like housing) but at the cost
of neglecting decisions made within the household concerning the level of public consumption and its
adjustment to the new bargaining environment. Maybe even more crucial when it comes to labor supply
decisions in a couple, domestic production needs to be introduced, notably production of childcare.
30Maitra and Ray (2001) go in that direction by testing income pooling of the various income components in addition
to income pooling among spouses. As various tax-bene¯t instruments may have di®erent impact on household outcome,
the di®erent components of unearned income (asset returns, pensions, transfers) may have di®erent behavioral and welfare
impact. Interestingly, they ¯nd that men and women are much less likely to pool their transfer receipts than other type of
income.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Data and sample selection
The data used come from the second wave (1995) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).
We select three samples out of the data set (single men, single women, married couples) and restrict each
of the samples according to the following selection criteria. First, adult members must be in the age
bracket 25 - 55. Second, they must be engaged in salary jobs if they work (self-employed, farmers and
students are excluded);31 they must be `voluntarily' unemployed if they do not (registered unemployed
are excluded).32 Third, extreme households are withdrawn, especially the ones receiving important level
of non-labor income (capital income, pensions, etc.). Moreover, single individuals must not have children
in the household; couples must have no more than 3 children and no other adults than the basic couple;
households with working children are withdrawn. Wage rates are not provided directly and must be
computed.33 At this stage of the selection process, Figure 5 presents the distribution of work hours for
single men and women as well as husbands and wives.
The distribution of hours for single men and for husbands conveys to the exclusion of inactive men
from our samples (and non-participation is excluded from the set of possible options for single men and
31Self-employed and farmersare subject to income tax rules that may be very di®erent from the ones applied to earnings
and that require information which is not available. Their labor supply behavior may also be rather di®erent and would
require a di®erent modelling strategy altogether.
32One reason is the measurement di±culties connected with unemployment bene¯ts. Another is that unemployment is
considered as exogenous to the process at stake in the study.
33Individuals are asked to report the yearly wage income YW, the number of months worked during the year NM and
the numberof hours normally worked per week HW so thathourly wage rate can be computed as YW=(NM£HW £4:33).
21husbands in discrete models of labor supply at use here). In our selection, all men participate, 24% of
the wives do not and 16% of single women do not. Descriptive statistics for couples are provided in Table
18.
Table 18: descriptive statistics for selected couples
obs.¤ Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Weekly work hours husband# 1,440 41.2 7.9 8 84
Weekly work hours wife# 1,096 33.8 9.7 2 70
Hourly gross wage rate husband (in euro) 1,440 10.3 6 3.1 91.4
Hourly gross wage rate wife (in euro) 1,096 8.4 4.3 3.1 37
Age husband 1,440 40.3 7.6 25 54
Age wife 1,440 38.4 7.6 25 55
Dummy for Paris region 1,440 .17 .38 0 1
Dummy for children 1,440 .84 .37 0 1
Number of children 1,440 1.53 0.94 0 3
Dummy for education husband 1,440 .36 .48 0 1
Dummy for education wife 1,440 .36 .48 0 1
Note: dummy for Paris region: 1=Paris region; dummy for education: 1=high school or university degree.
*: number of observations; for hours worked and wages, this is the number of participating individuals, followed by the
corresponding statistics.
#: with the discretization used in the study, we have for the husbands: mean=42.6, min=40, max=60, and for the wives:
mean=34.3, min=0, max=50.
6.2 Estimation of individual preferences on singles
Parameters °c and °l are estimated separately and must eventually verify the usual restrictions 1 > °c >
0, 1 > °l > 0 and °c+°l = 1, which is done by imposing a posteriori normalization (the utility is rescaled
by their sum).
Maximum likelihood estimations were computed on SAS (codes are available upon request). Results
are reported in Table 19. All parameters are statistically di®erent from zero at conventional levels except
Paris region (consumption term) for men. In the sequel we assume that the regime chosen by each single
is the one which gives the best hours prediction, once ful¯lled the concavity restrictions.
Looking at Table 20, it appears that regime 2 prevails. It seems to be chosen too often but many
single men and many single women actually do not exhibit regular preferences under regime 1.
On the whole, 64:2% of actual discretized labor supply is well predicted for single women. It amounts
to 66:4% for single men. These ¯gures hide important discrepancies. For single women, respectively
75% and 94% of non-working and full-time working situations are correctly predicted. On the contrary,
part-time jobs are very badly predicted. Only 11% of them are properly predicted. About single men,
90 % of them are predicted to work 40 hours a week, where as 67 % actually do so. Apart from this
category, none of the other actual discretized hours are rightly predicted, but 28:6% of part-time hours.
Parameters ° are presented in Table 21 once normalized.
22Table 19: Mixed logit estimates for single individuals (two mass points)
variable coef. single men coef. single women
Marginal propensity for leisure °l :
Age -8.81 (2.03) 5.05 (1.20)
Education -40.89 (7.51) -2.27 (.59)
Paris region -3.03 (1.04) -3.27 (.77)
Marginal propensity for consumption °c :
Age -2.75 (1.09) 9.03 (3.16)
Education -27.27 (5.53) -0.56 (.29)
Paris region 0.37 (.71) -1.19 (.39)
Age£age Á -4.17 (1.58)
Heterogeneity on leisure:
µl1 8.72 (2.16) -3.23 (1.33)
µl2 58.99 (7.61) 46.87 (10.98)
Heterogeneity on consumption:
µc1 2.55 (1.13) -4.05 (1.48)
µc2 37.23 (5.67) 53.88 (12.84)
Heterogeneity probablility:
¼1 0.18 (.06) 0.57 (.03)
Log-likelihood -256.54 -397.86
Note : Education is an indicator for high school or university degree. Age is actual age divided by 40. Paris region equals
1 if the couple lives in Paris region, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are given in brackets. The asymptotic standard error for
the heterogeneity parameter was computed with the Delta method.
Table 20: estimated probabilities and frequencies of the regimes
Single men Single women
Regime r est. prob. ¼r frequency est. prob. ¼r frequency
1 .18 .06 0.57 0.25
2 .82 .94 0.43 0.75
Table 21: normalized marginal propensities of singles
Variable Coe±cient Std. dev. Min. 10% Median 90% Max.
°l
f .52 .15 .35 .37 .47 .80 .92
°c
f .48 .15 .08 .20 .53 .62 .65
°l
m .61 .03 .52 .57 .62 .63 .87
°c
m .39 .03 .13 .37 .38 .43 .48
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